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TOWARD A PRINCIPLED INTERPRETATION 
OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
THOMAS W. MERRILL" 
Formalism is the jurisprudence of rules.1 Functionalism is the 
jurisprudence of balancing tests.2 If forced to choose between 
formalism and functionalism, I would probably corne down on 
the side of formalism. I would not do so, however, because there 
is some meta-rule that prescribes formalism. Rather, it would be 
because formalism, on balance, has better consequences than 
functionalism-in other words, because there are good 
functionalist reasons to be a formalist.3 
Where I part company with many constitutional formalists is 
not so much over the desirability of rules as opposed to ad hoc 
balancing,4 but rather over the generality and the source of the 
• John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
1. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. 1. REv. 1, 9 (1983) 
(,,'Formalism' describes legal theories that stress the importance of rationally 
uncontroversial reasoning in legal decision, whether from highly particular rules or quite 
abstract principles.") (footnote omitted). 
2 See, e.g., ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 20-
22,136-175 (1982) (describing "pragmatic instrumentalism" and contrasting that approach 
with formalism). 
3. This is also the position implicit in recent work of my colleague Martin Redish, who 
has proposed joining formalist and functionalist methods in his "pragmatic formalist" 
approach to the separation of powers. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS 
POLITICAL STRUCTURE 100-03 (1995). 
4. Justice Scalia, a leading proponent of formal analYSiS, has questioned whether 
judicial balancing tests are even properly regarded as rules of law, and has described his 
own approach to rules and balancing tests in the following way: 
I have not said that legal determinations that do not reflect a general rule can 
be entirely avoided. We will have totality of the circumstances tests and 
balancing modes of analysis with us forever-and for my sins, I will probably 
write some of the opinions that use them. All I urge is that those modes of 
analysis be avoided where possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be 
extended as far as the nature of the question allows; and that, to foster a 
correct attitude toward the matter, we appellate judges bear in mind that 
when we have finally reached the point where we can do no more than 
consult the totality of the circumstances, we are acting more as fact-finders 
than as expositors of the law. 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule 0/ Law as a Law 0/ Rules, 56 U. CI-ll. 1. REv. 1175,1186-87 (1989) 
(emphasis supplied); see also id. at 1182 (stating that the use of balancing tests "is, in a 
way, a regrettable concession of defeat-an acknowledgment that we have passed the 
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rules we apply. Rules come in different levels of generality, from 
abstract "principles" on the one hand to specific "commands" on 
the other. Although some formalists believe that the Constitution 
can be described as a collection of commands-an If instruction 
manual" 5-most of the key provisions of the Constitution are best 
regarded as principles. This description is consistent with both 
the breadth of the language used by the Constitution and the 
basic purpose of such a document-to create a permanent 
framework for government "adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs."6 
I also do not subscribe to the view associated with many 
formalists that the content of all constitutional rules is to be 
discovered in some immutable original understanding? Instead, I 
prefer to deploy a If conventionalist" approach to constitutional 
interpretation, drawing upon a variety of sources that our legal 
community regards as authoritative.s These sources include the 
text of the Constitution and the evidence of the Framers' 
intentions, but also encompass the outcomes reached by the 
Supreme Court and other interpreters in applying the text to 
different controversies over time, as well as the evolved practices 
of the three branches of government.9 
Discovering principles of constitutional law consistent with 
these diverse sources entails a process of reasoning similar to 
what appellate lawyers call seeking the "theory of the case." 
What we are seeking, in other words, is at least one principle that 
harmonizes the text, the evidence of original understanding, and 
the past authoritative pronouncements and practices of the legal 
community. The process is akin to what Ronald Dworkin calls 
the method of integrity,lO or to what students of historiography 
call the search for" covering laws" -constructs or hypotheses that 
integrate and explain a mass of historical data over a period of 
point where 'law,' properly speaking, has any further application.") 
5. Gary Lawson, In Praise qfWoodenness, 11 GEO. MAsoN U. L. REv. 21, 21-22 n.9 (1988). 
6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,415 (1819) (emphasis omitted). 
7. For various perspectives on the value of originalism in judicial interpretation, see 
Symposium, Originalism. Democracy, and the Constitution: The Fourteenth Annual National 
Student Federalist Society Symposium on Lav.' and Public Policy-1995, 19 HARV. J.L. & PlJB. 
POL'Y 237 (1996). 
8. The case for conventionalism is developed more completely in Thomas W. Merrill, 
Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 509 (1996) (proposing "conventionalism" as a 
principled conservative alternative to the restrictive originalism of Judge Bork and the 
untethered "normativism" of Justice Brennan). 
9. See id. at 516. 
10. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LA'W"s EMPIRE (1986). 
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time.H 
Rather than pursue in an abstract vein about how legal 
interpreters should try to discover constitutional principles, it 
may be better to illustrate the conventionalist method by 
applying it to a particular structural constitutional issue. The 
issue I have in mind concerns the meaning of the clause in the 
Constitution that empowers Congress I/[t]o regulate Commerce ... 
among the several States."12 The effort to interpret these words 
has always been challenging.13 Today, the need to develop a 
principled interpretation of the Commerce Gause is more urgent 
than ever. Two recent developments pose a sharp challenge to 
received understandings of the clause, both in its role as an 
affirmative grant of legislative power to Congress and as a 
restriction on the regulatory powers of the States. 
The first development is the decision in United States v. Lopez,14 
where the Supreme Court announced, in effect, that it intends to 
take the words of the Commerce Clause much more seriously 
insofar as they constitute a grant of affirmative power to 
Congress to regulate commerce. Unfortunately, although the 
Court evinced a will, it is unclear whether it saw a way. The 
majority opinion of the Chief Justice lacks any clear theory of the 
outer limits of the clause. The Court badly needs a principled 
understanding of the Commerce Gause if it is to continue down 
the path of enforcing the constitutional limitations on federal 
power. 
The second development is the emergence of a group of 
Justices-led by Justice Scalia and including Justice Thomas and 
sometimes the Chief Justice-who openly question the Court's 
11. This theory is generally associated with the work of Carl Hempel. See Carl G. 
Hempel, The Function 0/ General Laws in History, 39 J. PHIL. 36 (1942) (arguing that 
knowledge progresses as deductive reasoning applies ever-expanding covering laws to 
more and more phenomena, emolling them into causal chains which, in tum, connect 
previously unexplained phenomena); see also PATRICK L GARDINER, THE NATURE OF 
HISTORICAL ExPLANATION 92·93, 98-102 (1952) (discussing Hempel's theory). 
12. US. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. For another illustration of my approach to the 
interpretation of structural provisions of the Constitution, see Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Constitutional Principle o/Separation o/Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 225. 
13. For historical discussions of the difficult and conflicting evolution of Commerce 
Gause jurisprudence, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 5-4, 
305·10 (2d ed. 1988); Richard A Epstein, The Proper Scope o/the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L 
REv. 1387,1398-1452 (1987). 
14. 514 US. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which 
criminalized the possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school, as an ultra vires 
exercise of congreSSional authority under the Commerce Clause). 
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dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, asserting that it has no 
foundation in the constitutional text.15 If the dormant Commerce 
Clause is to continue to be enforced, the majority of the Court 
needs a theory that establishes the legitimacy of the doctrine in 
the face of this critique. 
Is it possible to articulate a principled theory of the Commerce 
Clause through the conventionalist method? Perhaps. After 
engaging in a process of rumination that involves moving back 
and forth between the text of the Clause, the history of early 
controversies over its meaning, and the doctrinal pattern that has 
emerged in the decisions of the Court in recent decades, I think 
that a unified theory that explains both halves of the Commerce 
Clause-the affirmative grant of power to Congress and the 
dormant Commerce Clause limitations on state power-can be 
discerned. This theory rests on four principles. The first two are 
fairly traditional; at least they would be readily recognized by the 
Justices who sat on the Marshall and Taney Courts. The third and 
the fourth are innovations-modern refinements needed to 
reconcile the evolving doctrine under the Clause with the text 
and the earlier understandings devised by prior generations of 
jurists. I shall give a brief survey of the four principles. 
The first principle is that lI[c]ommerce ... among the several 
States" refers to some aspect of commercial activity-some 
element of the formation or performance of a commercial 
contract-that actually crosses a state line. All kinds of things can 
qualify as an element that crosses a state line. It can include 
children traveling to attend summer camps in Maine16 or the flow 
of electrons moving over telephone lines from one state to 
15. Justice Scalia first declared that the dormant Commerce Gause has "no conceivable 
basis in the text of the Commerce Clause" in Tyler Pipe lndus., lnc. v. Washington Dep't 
of Revenue, 483 U.s. 232, 262 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The most recent criticism to this effect is found in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, lnc. v. 
Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct 1590, 1614-20 (1997) (Thomas, J. dissenting, joined by Scalia, 
J., and Rehnquist, c.J.). Criticism of the dormant Commerce Clause has not been limited 
to the courts. See. e.g., Steven Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial 
Non-Intervention, 69 OR. 1. REv. 895 (1990) (arguing that the basis of dormant Commerce 
Gause doctrine is weak and that it shields both federal and state political branches from 
accountability); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and 
the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE 1.J. 569, 573 (arguing that the Court's 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence "lacks any basis in constitutional democratic 
theory" and that this "judicial supplement to the text" of the Constitution "actually 
contradicts, and therefore directly undermines, the Constitution's carefully established 
textual structure for allocating power between federal and state sovereigns"). 
16. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 117 S. ct. at 1593-94 (1997). 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
No.1] Toward a Principled Interpretation 35 
anotherP But some aspect of either the formation or performance 
of a commercial transaction must cross a state line. 
The constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce has 
long been held to extend beyond the precise element that actually 
crosses state lines and to include any activity that /I affects 
interstate commerce."lS We should interpret this to mean that the 
constitutional power encompasses any activity that increases or 
decreases the frequency of, or otherwise modifies, an element of 
contractual activity that crosses a state line. Thus, the power to 
regulate interstate commerce can apply to activities that take 
place wholly inside one state, but if and only if there is some 
nexus between the regulation of that activity and the passage of 
matter or energy across state lines. 
The principle that interstate commerce means some element of 
commercial activity that crosses a state line rests comfortably in 
the text of the Constitution and would come as no surprise to the 
Justices of the Marshall and Taney Courts, who struggled with 
the initial efforts to interpret the clause. The gloss that expands 
the power to include anything that affects interstate commerce is 
more problematic as a matter of original understanding.l9 The 
Necessary and Proper Clause,20 however, arguably provides an 
additional increment of constitutional power that allows us at 
least to reconcile the /I affecting commerce" gloss with the 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 434-35 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding 
Travel Act convictions based on the defendants' use of interstate phone calls to verify 
credit card transactions used to pay for acts of prostitution); if. Moore v. United States, 
No. 93-5273,1994 WL 251174, at *3 (4th Cir. June 10, 1994) (upholding a conviction under 
the federal arson statute and finding an interstate commerce connection in the fact that 
the house that had been burned was connected to interstate gas and telephone lines). 
18. See, e.g., A. 1. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.s. 495, 546 (1935) 
("Interstate commerce is brought in only upon the charge that violations of these 
provisions-as to hours and wages of employees and local sales-' affected' interstate 
commerce."). 
19. Note, however, that the idea that congreSSional power extends to activity 
"affecting" interstate commerce can be traced to the Court's first full opinion interpreting 
the Commerce Clause, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 u.s. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (1824) (describing the 
activities that Congress may not regulate as those "which do not affect other States"). The 
move that almost certainly takes the affecting commerce doctrine beyond the original 
understanding is the "aggregation principle" of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.s. 111 (1942), 
which allows Congress to regulate any activity having a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce when viewed in the aggregate, regardless of the triviality of individual 
transactions. See id. at 127-28. 
20. U.s. CaNST. art. I, § 8, d. 18 (providing that Congress shall have the power "[t]o 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Deparbnent or Officer thereof"). 
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constitutional text. 
The next principle is that the power to regulate commerce 
among the several states is an exclusive power. Only Congress 
can regulate interstate commerce; no state may regulate interstate 
commerce. This exclusive grant understanding is the only way to 
square the constitutional text with the dormant Commerce 
Gause doctrine. Because states have no power to regulate 
interstate commerce, state laws that are found to be regulations of 
interstate commerce are void, without regard to whether 
Congress has legislated on the subject. On the other hand, if 
Congress subsequently exercises its exclusive power, and says 
that states are permitted to engage in regulation of the sort 
invalidated by the Court, then the decision of the Court no longer 
applies because the state regulation now has the sanction of 
Congress. The exclusive powers construction therefore explains 
the paradox that Congress can "overrule" Supreme Court 
decisions in this area by ordinary legislation, but not otherwise in 
constitutionallaw.21 
The second principle, more so than the first, has always been a 
controversial interpretation of the text of the Constitution. 
Whether the commerce power is exclusive or concurrent was 
hotly debated by the Justices who sat on the Marshall and Taney 
Courts, and they reached no definitive conclusion.22 Many 
21. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin. 328 U.S. 408,426-27 (1946) (holding that 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act authorizes states to regulate and tax insurance companies 
notwithstanding prior authority holding such regulation invalid under the dormant 
Commerce Gause); Gark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 321-25 (1917) 
(holding that the Webb-Kenyon Act left states free to regulate commerce in intoxicating 
liquors in ways previously prohibited under the dormant Commerce Clause); see also 
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 
89 HARv. L REv. 1, 3-10, 15-16 (1975) (discussing dormant Commerce Gause 
jurisprudence as a primary example of "constitutional common law"); Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CI-ll. L. REv. 1, 54, 56 & n.239 
(1985) (discussing Monaghan's analysis). 
22. Compare Gibbons, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) at 196-210 (finding "great force" in argument 
that the commerce power is exclusive but not reaching the question); Brown v. Maryland, 
25 U.s. (12 Wheat.) 419, 446-49 (1827) (stating in dictum that commerce power is 
exclusive) and The Passenger Cases, 48 U.s. (7 How.) 283, 572-73 (1849) (three and 
possibly five Justices take position that the commerce power is exclUSive) with The license 
Cases, 46 U.s. (5 How.) 504,578-79 (1847) (stating that "the mere grant of power to the 
general government cannot, upon any just principles of construction, be construed to be 
an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any power over the same subject by the States" 
and holding that a state may "make regulations of commerce for its own ports and 
harbours, and for its own territory and that such regulations are valid unless they come in 
conflict with a law of Congress") . See generally DAVlD P. CURRIE, THE CONSTmmON IN 
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 168-183, 204-06, 222-36, 33042, 
403-16 (1985); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATE RIGHTS (1936); 
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scholars today dismiss the exclusive powers interpretation as 
unsound.23 They point out that the Commerce Power, unlike 
other powers in Article I, Section 8, such as the power to lay 
duties and imposts or the power to coin money,24 is not coupled 
with a provision in Article I, Section la, limiting the power of the 
states to engage in such regulation.25 This raises the inference that 
the commerce power is concurrent rather than exclusive. 
But the issue is far from one-sided. A number of eminent 
figures from the founding generation-including Madison,26 
Marshall,27 and Story28-endorsed the exclusive power 
construction. One can argue, moreover, that the power to 
regulate commerce among the several states is a power that, by 
its very nature, cannot be exercised satisfactorily by any single 
state. At least two states are involved in any case involving 
interstate commerce, and they may have conflicting policies or 
interests as to how such commerce should be regulated. To allow 
state law to govern interstate transactions would thus allow each 
state to be the judge of its own cause, a circumstance that the 
Framers consistently identified as the quintessential example of 
injustice.29 
But the point here is not to identify the best interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause as if we were answering a multiple choice 
examination based solely on the words of the Constitution. The 
objective is to find the interpretation that provides the best "fit" 
FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE ClAUSE UNDER MARsHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 
(1937). 
23. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy Doctrine Out of its Misery, 12 
CARDOZO L. REv. 1745, 1745-46 (1991); Redish & Nugent, supra note 15, at 573. 
24. See US. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1,5. 
25. See US. CONST. art I, § 10 (forbidding states without the consent of Congress to 
"lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports [or] lay any Duty of Tonnage," and 
forbidding states to "coin Money"). 
26. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 625 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(attributing the following observation to Madison: "Whether the States are now restrained 
from laying tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power 'to regulate commerce.' 
These terms are vague but seem to exclude this power of the States .... "). 
27. See Gibbons, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) at 209 (Marshall, q.) (noting "great force" in the 
argument for the exclusive power construction). 
28. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
513 (Rothman & Co. ed., 1991) (1833) (arguing that a grant of absolute power to Congress 
necessarily precludes any state action). 
29. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 
1961) ("No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest, would 
certainty bias his judgement, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay 
with gre~ter reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same 
time .... ). 
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with both the text and our constitutional traditions and practices. 
The best interpretation in this sense-the most coherent and 
principled interpretation-has to include the exclusive powers 
interpretation, because only that interpretation squares the text of 
the Constitution with 150 years of dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. 
Now come the innovations. The third principle is that, in 
deciding whether a legislative body like the Congress or a state 
legislature has violated the Commerce Clause, we look to the 
intent behind the legislation rather than its effect. Why intent? 
The reason is similar to that which led the Supreme Court, in 
Washington v. Davis,3o to hold that the Equal Protection Clause 
bars legislation that reflects a discriminatory intent toward 
protected groups, but not legislation having a disparate impact 
on such groupS.31 All kinds of laws have a disparate impact on 
protected groups. The Court in Washington was concerned that a 
disparate impact standard would cast the command of equality 
far too broadly32 and would necessitate the development of an 
elaborate jurisprudence distinguishing between disparate 
impacts that /I go too far" and those that do not-an inquiry for 
which there are no obvious answers. To avoid such an intrusive 
and unworkable result, the Court limited the Equal Protection 
Clause to governmental actions motivated by an invidious intent. 
Similarly, in a highly interdependent, advanced industrial 
society, virtually all commercial activity will have some causal 
connection to the movement of matter or energy across state 
lines. Our first two Commerce Gause principles tell us that 
Congress has the exclusive power to regulate anything that 
affects an element of commercial activity that crosses state lines. 
Thus, if we focus on the effect of economic regulation, it should 
be possible to discover an "interstate effect" in virtually every 
instance. Under an effects interpretation of the Commerce 
30. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
31. See id. at 239-41,244-46,248. 
32 See id. at 248 (noting that a disparate impact rule applied to facially neutral laws in 
the absence of compelling justification" would raise serious questions about, and perhaps 
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes 
that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more 
affluent white"); id. n.14 (listing "(s)ales taxes, bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, 
license fees, and other state-imposed charges" as other areas of concern along with 
"minimum wage and usury laws as well as professional licensing requirements") 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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Clause, therefore, Congress could regulate any and all forms of 
economic activity. This, of course, is basically consistent with the 
post-New Deal understanding. Conversely, however, under such 
an interpretation virtually all state economic regulation would be 
void under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. This result, 
needless to say, does not comport with the post-New Deal 
understanding, which has been generally sympathetic to all 
government regulation of economic activity, whether at the 
federal or the state and local levels. 
In an attempt to stave off these conclusions-especially the 
implication that the Commerce Clause requires massive 
deregulation of economic activity at the state level-the Court 
over the years developed various tests for distinguishing 
between "truly" interstate and "truly" local commerce.33 Each of 
these effects tests has eventually been deemed unworkable, 
however, and has been abandoned as a failure. 
Because no effects test has proved to be workable, we must 
turn to intent if we are to continue to enforce the constitutional 
language. Thus, with respect to congressional enactments, we 
must ask whether the intent of Congress is to regulate commerce 
insofar as it affects the movement of matter and energy across 
state lines (a permissible objective) or whether it is to regulate 
commercial activity without regard to whether there is any effect 
on interstate movements (an impermissible usurpation of the 
states' police powers). With respect to state enactments 
challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause, we must ask 
the same question: Is the state's intent to regulate commerce that 
affects more than one state-something that only Congress can 
do-or is the state's intent to regulate purely local effects? 
How do we ascertain the legislative intent of a collective body? 
Is this not a fiction? Is it not hopeless to think that courts will get 
it right? To complete the picture we need the fourth principle, 
which is that the courts will apply certain presumptions about 
legislative intent derived from long experience with recurring 
controversies. The most general presumption is one of deference; 
33. Two prominent efforts to develop such a measure were the "inherently national 
versus inherently local" test of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 u.s. (12 How.) 20/9, 319-20 
(1852), and the "direct versus indirect effect test," see, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp, 295 U.s. 
at 546 ("In determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate 
transactions upon the ground that they' affect' interstate commerce, there is a necessary 
and well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects."). 
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the legislature's intention is presumed to be a permissible one. 
The reason for this presumption is closely related to the reason 
for examining intent, rather than effects, in the first place: 
virtually all legislative enacbnents will have some interstate 
effects, and determining on a case-by-case basis whether the 
"dominant" intent of the legislature is to reach the interstate 
effects rather than the local effects would be time consuming, 
intrusive, and fraught with error. Thus, although only Congress 
can regulate interstate commerce and only the states can regulate 
purely intrastate commerce, we defer to both types of legislative 
bodies with respect to which type of regulation they intend. The 
result is that, in practice, we permit a significant degree of 
overlap between federal and state regulatory regimes. 
Notwithstanding the general pattern of deference to the 
intentions of both Congress and state legislatures, there are 
certain circumstances where the presumption of regularity is 
overcome. The Court has developed certain rules of thumb-or 
"red flags" if you will-that single out situations in which the 
presumption of permissible intent is reversed and the burden is 
placed on the legislative body to demonstrate that it is not seeking 
to usurp the constitutional prerogatives of the other sovereign. 
This approach is easiest to see with respect to the dormant 
Commerce Clause, which polices attempts by the states to usurp 
Congress's exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. 
The Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence says, in 
effect, that the Court will presume that the intent of state 
legislation is to regulate local activity pursuant to the police 
power, except in two principal situations. The first exception is 
where the state law differentiates between local and interstate 
commerce to the disadvantage of the latter, thus" discriminating" 
against interstate commerce. Much like the presumption adopted 
in equal protection law against laws that adopt racial or gender 
classifications,34 legislation that discriminates against interstate 
commerce is highly likely to be motivated by an impermissible 
intention-namely, to regulate interstate commerce rather than 
local activity. Thus, when we encounter discriminatory local 
laws, the presumption of permissible intent is reversed,35 and the 
34. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that racial classification 
triggers strict scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.s. 190 (1976) (holding that gender 
classification triggers heightened scrutiny). 
35. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.s. 325, 331 (1996) eState laws discriminating 
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state is required to show that it has a strong and legitimate local 
interest that justifies the discrimination.36 
The second exception is where the state law imposes a 
substantial burden on interstate commerce and the local benefits 
appear to be minimalP Again, laws that reflect such a disparity 
between interstate burdens and local benefits raise a red flag that 
the purpose is to regulate interstate commerce, not local activity. 
In these circumstances it is also appropriate that the presumption 
of regularity be reversed and the burden be placed on the state to 
show that its intent is indeed one of permissible local regulation. 
The doctrine that governs the affirmative scope of the 
commerce power is less developed, largely because the Court has 
been exceedingly deferential to Congress in the post-New Deal 
era. In effect, the presumption of permissible intent has been 
applied in a virtually conclusive fashion. Lopez, however, 
suggests that this approach might change, and it also suggests at 
least one set of circumstances where it is appropriate that the 
presumption of permissible congressional intent be reversed. As 
the Court noted, the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not regulate 
the channels of interstate commerce; it did not attempt to prohibit 
the interstate transportation of a commodity; it did not contain a 
jurisdictional element that would ensure that the firearm 
possession in question had some nexus with interstate commerce; 
and it did not regulate a form of commercial activity, such as 
buying and selling.38 Moreover, the statute as originally enacted 
contained no formal findings that possession of guns on school 
yards would substantially affect interstate commerce.39 
against interstate commerce on their face are 'virtually per se invalid.' ") (quoting Oregon 
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.s. 93, 99 (1994)). 
36. See, e.g., Marne v. Taylor, 477 U.s. 131, 138 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reI. 
Douglas, 458 U.s. 941, 957 (1982); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 
u.s. 333, 353 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.s. 349, 354 (1951)). 
37. This is the so-called" Pike test," named for Pike v. Bruch Church, Inc., 397 U.s. 137, 
142 (1970). For applications, see, for example, Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.s. 624, 646 (1982) 
(invalidating the Illinois Business Takeover Act because it "impose[d] a substantial 
burden on interstate commerce which outweigh[ed] its putative local benefits"); and 
Raymond Motor Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.s. 429, 447 (1978) (invalidating Wisconsin 
regulations restricting operation of trucks over 55 feet long and of double-trailer trucks 
traveling upon interstate highways "because they place a substantial burden on interstate 
commerce and they cannot be said to make more than the most speculative contribution 
to highway safety"). 
38. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.s. 549, 559-61 (1995). 
39. See id. at 563 ("But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to 
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected 
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, 
they are lacking here."). 
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The Court's opinion can thus be read as holding that, at least 
when all five of these traditional connections with interstate 
commerce are absent from a statute, the presumption of 
permissible intent will be reversed, and it will be incumbent on 
the government to prove that Congress's intention was in fact the 
regulation of some form of interstate commerce, as opposed to a 
usurpation of the police power of the states. 
Such a limitation on congressional power would be easy to 
circumvent, as Congress would simply have to take care to 
include some jurisdictional nexus with interstate commerce, or 
make appropriate findings, before it legislates.4o What is the point 
of requiring Congress to establish some nexus to interstate 
commerce, or include a finding of such a nexus, when it legislates 
under the authority of the Commerce Gause? 
One reason for insisting on some demonstrable nexus to 
interstate commerce is that this serves as a reminder that the 
federal government is a government of limited powers and thus 
that federal legislation requires some affirmative justification.41 
Another reason for insisting on such a nexus is that it preserves 
the principle that congressional legislation rooted in a desire to 
regulate purely local activity is unconstitutional. 
Notwithstanding the general presumption of permissible 
legislative intentions, the Court in extreme cases stands ready to 
enforce this bedrock principle. 
Perhaps most importantly, the nexus requirement renders the 
affirmative scope of the Commerce Gause symmetrical with the 
dormant Commerce Gause, and provides the key to a principled 
theory that relates both halves of the clause to the text of the 
Constitution. It is imperative that some such conception be 
articulated if the Court is to continue to enforce any limitations 
on the power of the federal government to regulate and if the 
Court is to continue to strike down state laws that discriminate 
against interstate commerce. I believe that both of these judicial 
functions are worthy of being sustained, and therefore the quest 
40. See H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REv. 651, 
651-52 (1995) (predicting that "the main effect of Lopez is very likely to be nothing more 
than a renewed congreSSional interest in loading federal criminal statutes with findings 
and 'jurisdictional element[s), in order to demonstrate the close link between what 
Congress wishes to regulate and 'Commerce ... among the several States"') (footnotes 
omitted) (alteration in the original). 
41. See Steven G. Calabresi "A Government o/Limited and Enumerated Powers ": In Defense 
ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 802-ffi (1995). 
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for a principled theory of the Commerce Clause-whether along 
the lines sketched here or on some other basis-should be among 
the most pressing concerns of constitutional scholars. 
